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Abstract
In August 2002, floods in central Europe caused damage of about € 15 billion; insured
losses were about € 3.1 billion. According to Munich Reinsurance, this was the most
expensive natural disaster of the year 2002. In Germany, heavy rains led to some of the
worst flooding the Free State of Saxony has witnessed in more than a century. In
Dresden, the Elbe River rose from a normal summer level of about two meters to 9.13
meters surpassing the historical flood mark of 8.77 meters seen in March 1845, to reach
on August 17, 2002, a water level of 9.40 meters – the highest level that has ever been
recorded in Dresden.
Shortly after the flood event, overall damage in Germany was estimated to be € 22
billion, which in December 2002 was revised to about € 9.1 billion of direct losses.
Concerning the regional distribution of losses, Saxony was hit hardest. With direct
damage of € 6.084 billion the federal state bears 67% of the total losses. About 14.9%
(€ 1.353 billion) of the overall damage is corresponding to the German government and
11.3% (€ 1.029 billion) to the state of Saxony-Anhalt.
The major share of about € 3.316 billion accrued to state and municipal infrastructure
(36.6%), federal infrastructure losses were € 1.353 billion (14.9%); private households
suffered about € 2.547 billion of losses (28.1%), followed by private companies with €
1.438 billion (15.9%).
The compensation of the flood losses was mainly financed by a special disaster relief
and reconstruction fund set up by both the National Government and the federal states
of Germany. This so-called Sonderfonds Aufbauhilfe amounted to € 7.1 billion, or
seventy-eight percent of total direct losses. Other sources of financing were the
insurance (estimated to amount to € 1.8 billion), an European Union emergency fund (€
444 million), and public donations (€ 243 million). Total financing available amounting
to 9.6 billion Euro thus exceeds the direct losses incurred, which will only be financed.
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Considering that government compensation will be provided in terms of replacement
costs rather than current value lost, still all direct losses could be compensated in theory.
Compared to total compensation provided in other major events in developed countries,
which on average amounted to 45% of total losses, this large financing provided is
exceptional. This can be attributed to the following factors: the floods constituted the
largest losses ever in Germany and were commonly considered an event with a return
period of less than 1000 years (Jahrtausendhochwasser, millenium floods); the floods
mainly affected East Germany that is still struggling economically and where unem-
ployment is high; some observers cite the “hot” election phase as federal elections were
in their final stages of what was known to be a very close election.
The provision of government funds to the affected private households and companies
and municipalities was and is governed by a set of principles that were explicitly set out
by the government in order to guarantee the efficient allocation of the funds, allow
quick reconstruction and provide and keep incentives for ex-ante measures. These
principles include: subsidiarity (the delegation of responsibilities to the lowest adminis-
trative level feasible), parallelity (reconstruction in the affected East German region was
and is parallel and independent of Aufbau Ost (reconstruction in East Germany after
reunification), provision of Incentives (inclusion of deductibles in order to maintain
incentives for mitigation and insurance), efficiency (financing of direct losses only to
primarily compensate those worst affected), and the ability to rebuild (loss financing
was provided in terms of reconstruction costs rather than current values).
Regarding financing on the municipal level, the Saxon cities of Dresden and Pirna
were examined since both experienced large damages to their infrastructure and public
assets: Dresden € 400 million, equaling forty-seven percent of the municipal budget of
2002, and Pirna € 22 million or thirty-five percent as a fraction of the budget. The cities
expect to be reimbursed ninety percent of their damages in the currently ongoing
financing negotiations. Also, large losses were suffered by the private households and
business, however, these will not be compensated by the local governments but by the
Sonderfonds Aufbauhilfe. Households can expect to receive eighty percent of their
losses, businesses up to seventy-five percent.
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1Disaster Loss Financing in Germany –
The Case of the Elbe River Floods 2002
Reinhard Mechler, Juergen Weichselgartner
1 Introduction
Roughly one third of all losses due to nature’s forces can be attributed to flooding; in
the last fifteen years of the 20th century flood losses amounting to more than US$ 250
billion had to be born by societies all over the world (MUNICH RE 1999: 65). In Europe,
the last extreme flood events occurred in August 2002. Severe flooding along the Elbe
River and its tributaries caused billions of Euro of damage in Germany and the Czech
Republic. Moreover, the Danube River damaged infrastructure in Southern Germany,
Austria, and Hungary.
Table 1: Costliest floods in recent years (original values in US$ bn, not adjusted for inflation)
Rank Year Country
(mainly affected regions)
Economic
Losses
Insured [%]
1 1998 China (Yangtze, Songhua) 31.0 3
2 1996 China (Yangtze) 24.0 2
3 1993 USA (Mississippi) 21.0 6
4 1995 North Korea 15.0 0
5 1993 China (Yangtze, Huai) 11.0 0
6 2002 Germany (Elbe) 9.8 < 20
7 1994 Italy (North) 9.3 < 1
8 1993 Bangladesh, India, Nepal 8.5 0
9 2000 Italy (North), Switzerland (South) 8.5 6
10 1999 China (Yangtze) 8.0 0
11 1994 China (Southeast) 7.8 0
12 1995 China (Yangtze) 6.7 1
13 2001 USA (Texas) 6.0 58
14 1997 Czech Republic, Poland, Germany (Odra) 5.9 13
Source: modified after KRON & THUMERER (2002: 3)
2The Elbe floods in summer 2002 with losses estimated at about € 9.1 billion were
one of the worst flood loss events in Europe and Germany ever (see Table 1). However,
whereas in developing countries, often substantial financing resource gaps occur after
disasters and a large amount of losses cannot be compensated, in the Elbe floods almost
100% of the necessary financing mainly provided by government sources was available
to compensate private households, business and local governments. However, providing
such massive compensation naturally raises questions about equity (compensating the
insured vs. the uninsured) and maintaining incentives for ex-ante mitigation and risk
financing measures to be undertaken by the private sector.
A recent IIASA report investigates the effects of imposing different policy options
for a flood risk management program using a system analytical approach (see Ekenberg
et al. 2003). Foci of this study are options for designing a public-private insurance and
reinsurance system, as well as the analysis of a set of policy packages that could gain
consensus among different stakeholders. As illustrated in Figure 1, the integrated catas-
trophe flood model applied in Hungary included both physical and social parameters.
By combining different models, it was demonstrated how an implementation of a
simulation and decision analytical model can provide useful insights into flood policy
options.
The present report focuses on the analysis of how the losses in Germany, particularly
in the federal state of Saxony, were financed and how they were shared between the
victims, insurance companies, and the different levels of government in the strongly
federalized governmental system typical of Germany. In addition, the report discusses
the principles employed to ensure the most efficient use of government funds, to help
the affected to recover as quickly as possible and to maintain incentives for ex-ante risk
mitigation and financing measures.
3Figure 1: IIASA's system analytical approach, applied in the Tisza river basin
Source: J. WEICHSELGARTNER
The structure of the report is as follows: first, the context of the floods is addressed in
chapter 2, ranging from hydrological aspects through response measures to responsibili-
ties. Then, in chapter 3 an analysis of the flood losses is presented using official data
gathered through a literature review and expert interviews (the experts interviewed are
listed in Annex 3). This sets the stage for a review of loss prevention strategies in
Germany as well as the instruments and principles used in financing the losses in
chapter 4. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
Figure 2 gives an overview about the study location; Table 2 shows a general com-
parative profile of Saxony and the two cities of Dresden and Pirna.
4Figure 2: Study location
Source: J. WEICHSELGARTNER
Table 2: General profile of Saxony, Dresden, and Pirna
Unit Saxony Dresden Pirna
Inhabitants (12/01) 1 000 4 392.7 472.921 41.065
Unemployed (09/01) 1 000 399.3
(19%)
37.662
(16.1%)
3.664
(15.1%)
Trade tax income 106 € 499.800
(12/01)
36.832
(12/01)
7.805
(12/00)
Source: Statistical Office of the Free State of Saxony (2002), Stadt Dresden (2002), Stadt Pirna
(2001)
52 Elbe River Floods 2002
2.1 Geo-Hydrological Aspects
The Elbe River basin covers different geographical regions from middle mountain
ranges in the west and south to large flatlands and lowlands in the central, north, and
eastern part of the basin (see Figure 3). From its 1394 m high source in the Czech
Krkonose (Riesengebirge in) to its mouth in the German Cuxhaven at the North Sea, the
Elbe River (Czech name: Labe) has a length of 1165 km (700 km in Germany) and a
drainage basin of 148,268 km² (two-third in Germany, one-third in the Czech Republic;
see Bundesanstalt für Gewässerkunde 2002: 1). In contrast to flooding, the Elbe region
is the driest of the five largest German river basins, so that water stress and water defi-
ciencies occur earlier and more frequently in the case of droughts than in other parts of
Germany. According to LAWA (1995) – the so-called Länder Working Group on Water
which was set up in 1956 as an amalgamation of the ministries of the federal states of
Germany responsible for water management and water legislation – eighty percent of
former flooding areas have been separated from the streambed of the Elbe River and
canals connect the river to the Rivers Weser and Rhine as well as to the River Odra.
Today, there are several monitoring activities in the Elbe River and its tributaries that
are coordinated by the International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe
(contracting parties are Germany, the Czech Republic, and the EU). In Germany, the
“ARGE Elbe” – a working group comprising the federal states of Hamburg, Lower
Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania
and Brandenburg – is in charge of monitoring the Elbe.
Starting on August 6, 2002, a complex weather situation over central Europe led to
heavy and widespread precipitation in Hungary, Austria, southern-western parts of
Czech Republic, as well as eastern and southern Germany. Coming from England, the
low pressure system “Ilse” passed along the southern part of the Alps and then headed
for Saxony in a so-called Vb track. In a ten-day period from August 1 to 10, precipi-
tation of about 60 mm fell widely in the Elbe River drainage basin area, followed by
strong rainfall on August 11 through 13 (see Bundesanstalt für Gewässerkunde 2002:
9). The accumulated precipitation (in mm) of the twelve-day-period from August 1 to
613, 2002, 8:00 AM Central European Summer Time, is shown in Figure 4; the numbers
represent the percentage of the average precipitation in August 2002.
Figure 3: Drainage basin of the Elbe River
Source: modified after Bundesanstalt für Gewässerkunde (2002: 45)
7Figure 4: Accumulated precipitation from August 1 – 13, 2002
Source: modified after Deutscher Wetterdienst, Global Precipitation Climatology Centre
(URL: http://www.dwd.de/research/gpcc)
8The complex weather conditions, marked by the rain-bearing, low-pressure system
“Else” tracking across Europe and a depression occurring slightly earlier south of the
Alps, are the direct natural cause of the flooding in 2002. Many areas in southern Czech
Republic and eastern Germany had rainfalls of 100 mm to 200 mm; in some areas,
precipitation was in only three days two to four times higher than the regular monthly
average (see Table 3). Thus the soil’s capacity to retain water was exceeded.
Table 3: Accumulated precipitation of selected stations
Station AEo* in km² Precipitation in mm
Aug. 1961/1990 Aug. 1-10, 2002 Aug. 11-13, 2002
Dresden 53,096 71 58 99
Wittenberg 61,879 70 58 102
Aken 70,093 70 60 105
Magdeburg 94,942 71 55 89
Wittenberge 123,532 67 56 85
Neu-Darchau 131,950 65 56 79
* Superficial drainage basin
Source: modified after Bundesanstalt für Gewässerkunde (2002: 13)
In East Germany, the meteorological situation led to flooding on several minor
rivers, including the Gottleuba in Pirna, and on the mainstream Elbe River with
extremely high water levels causing also widespread flooding in surrounding low-lying
areas. Figure 5 – false-color images of the Elbe River and its tributaries taken by the
Enhanced Thematic Mapper plus (ETM+) flying aboard the Landsat 7 satellite – shows
the dimension of the flooding in 2002. In the right-hand image taken on August 20,
2002, land is primarily green with a little red, water is blue, and cities are slate gray. In
the left-hand image taken two years earlier on August 14, 2000, land is primarily red
with patches of green, water is nearly black, and cities are purple.
9Figure 5: The Elbe River on August 14, 2000, and on August 20, 2002
Source: modified after German Aerospace Center (DLR)
(URL: http://www.dlr.de)
The comparison graphically illustrates the extension of the normal run-off of the
Elbe River in summer 2002. Given the heavy rainfall and the maximum water levels
reached in August 2002, it is no surprise that both banks and dams have been destroyed,
resulting in an inundated area of about 300 km². In Table 4 both historical water levels
and water heights observed in 2002 are listed comparatively. The high numbers of new
records (in bold) underline the extremity of the 2002 floods.
The comparison with historical floods demonstrates that the floods in 2002 can be
considered as an extreme event (see Table 5). In Dresden, on August 17 the Elbe River
rose from a normal summer level of about two meters to 9.40 m, surpassing the histori-
cal flood mark of 8.77 m recorded on March 31, 1845, by 63 cm, indicating that the
flood was of a magnitude that would be observed once in 300 years in terms of the flow
rate and once in 200 years in terms of the water level.
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Table 4: Water levels in 2002 at different gauge stations
Gauge station River km* Highest W in cm
Date W in cm
Elbe Flood
2002**
Usti n. L. -38,70 - 1119 1185
Schöna 2,10 April 1941 868 1202
Dresden 55,60 March 1845 877 940
Riesa 108,40 March 1988 755 945
Torgau 154,60 March 1940 863 945
Wittenberg 214,10 November 1980 624 707
Aken 274,80 March 1845 740 765
Barby 295,50 March 1845 733 700
Magdeburg 326,60 February 1941 701 670
Tangermünde 388,20 March 1981 670 767
Wittenberge 454,80 January 1920 715 734
Schnackenburg 474,60 April 1988 692 751
Dömitz 504,70 March 1888 744 657
Neu Darchau 536,40 April 1895 724 732
* Point Zero is the Czech-German border ** New records in bold
Source: modified after Bundesanstalt für Gewässerkunde (2002: 32)
Table 5: Elbe River floods since 1500, gauge station Dresden
Rank Date W in cm Q in m3/s Rank Date W in cm Q in m3/s
1 17 August 2002 940 ca. 5,000 14 30 June 1698 765 3,400
2 31 March 1845 877 5,700 15 3 January 1651 755 3,200
3 1 March 1784 857 5,200 16 1 May 1531 753 3,200
4 16 August 1501 857 5,000 17 28 June 1824 753 3,169
5 7 February 1655 838 4,800 18 11 April 1865 748 3,300
6 6/7 September 1890 837 4,350 19 4 March 1827 746 3,078
7 3 February 1862 824 4,493 20 27 March 1814 739 2,987
8 24 February 1799 824 4,400 21 22 April 1785 737 2,950
9 2 March 1830 796 3,950 22 18 January 1682 735 2,900
10 17 March 1940 778 3,360 23 27 March 1895 734 3,037
11 20 February 1876 776 3,286 24 7 May 1896 732 3,070
12 11 April 1900 773 3,200 25 28 March 1821 732 2,896
13 17 January 1920 772 3,190 26 25 March 1886 727 2,929
Source: modified after DEUTSCH (2000: 34)
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Pirna and particularly its historical town is even higher exposed to flooding since it is
not only located at the Elbe River but also at the Gottleuba River. Although of a much
smaller size, the latter caused disastrous floods in 1927 and in 1957. Figure 6 shows the
flood exposure of Pirna and the flood consequences using the Dohnaische Strasse (a
downtown shopping street in Pirna) on August 20, 2002, as an example.
Figure 6: Flood exposure and damage in Pirna
Source: modified after City of Pirna, photo by Lutz HAUPTMANN
(URL: http://www.pirna.de/html/wirtschaft.html)
(URL: http://www.lutz-hauptmann.de/webcam/hochwasser/index7.html)
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2.2 Disaster Management Aspects
2.2.1 Mitigation
In Germany it is the legal obligation of the public sector to protect the population from
natural disasters. Concerning flood disaster management, measures to be provided by
the state include structural measures, such as dams and retention basins, and non-
structural measures, such as monitoring, forecasting and early warning systems. In
practice, flood control measures are principally the responsibility of the Länder, but the
federal state also has statutory responsibility for flood protection (see Table 6). Due to
the federal system, a variety of legislation concerns water management, such as, the
Wasserhaushaltsgesetz (Water Management Act), Bundesnaturschutzgesetz (Federal
Nature Conservation Act), Bundesbaugesetz (Federal Construction Act), Umweltver-
träglichkeitsprüfungsgesetz (Environmental Assessment Act), Wasserverbandsgesetz
(Water Associations Act), and the Bundeswasserstrassengesetz (Federal Waterways
Act) (see PORTMANN & GERHARD 1997: 49).
Table 6: Competence in Germany concerning flood protection
Competence
Legal embodiment Primarily, Water Resources Management Act and Länder-specific water laws.
However, there are several other competence schemes related to flood
management, such as, Water Associations Act, Federal Waterways Act,
Drinking Water Ordinance, and the Waste Water Billing Act.
Responsibilities Länder Ministry of the Interior as highest disaster protection authority;
districts and city authorities as subordinate disaster protection authorities.
Instruments Flood prevention plans, upkeep and maintenance plans for flood prevention
plants and flood forecasting, early warning systems.
Source: J. Weichselgartner
The characteristic flood control measure in the Elbe River basin are dikes and, as
mentioned above, the federal state is responsible to maintain the dikes, along small
waterways the local communities. In total, around 127 km along the Elbe River are
protected by dikes providing protection generally for floods with a hundred-year
recurrence interval (see Table 7, to give a point of reference: the length of River Elbe
within Dresden’s city boundary is 30 km). However, the floods in August 2002 are
statistically considered a millennium flood and thus exceeded many protection
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structures. Moreover, 93 km of the dikes along the Elbe River are built before 1900 and
32 km are built between 1900 and 1945. This inhomogeneous structure results in a
decrease in reliability. What’s more, a great number of flood damage occurred in small
basins without adequate flood protection.
Table 7 also shows the existing retention basins. This type of flood control measure
is often demanded, especially after flooding has occurred. However, the creation of
retention basins is not easy since space is usually limited. Also in Germany, a total
restoration of natural flood plains is politically and practically infeasible and accord-
ingly the planning of retention basins is limited to a few sites. Moreover, the
construction of retention basins requires considerable public resistance to be overcome,
with the result that long lead times are required for the process from planning to
acceptance of the development plan.
Table 7: Dikes and retention basins in the Elbe River drainage basin
Dikes
River Length in km Height in m
Elbe 127.1 1.6 – 4.7
Biela 0.3 0.9 – 1.1
Dahle 6.6 1.5
Weinske 22.0 1.0 – 3.0
Retention Basins
River Location (District) Seize in ha
Dresden 1557.0Elbe
1010.0
Jahna 460.0
Döllnitz
Riesa-Großenhain
145.0
Wesenitz Bautzen 201.0
Total 3 373.0
Source: modified after Sächsische Staatsregierung (2002a: 48 and 54)
In addition, a structural flood measure that is quite unusual in Germany should be
mentioned in this report: relocation. Röderau-Süd, a section of Dresden with about 400
inhabitants (over 130 families) developed during the last decade and totally flooded in
August 2002, is planned to be relocated and the house owners compensated (interview
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with U. KRAUS, December 10, 2002). Many argue that both the German suffix Au
– which means natural flood plain – and Figure 7 indicate that this area should not have
been developed. Today, the relocation measure may costs € 50 million (LACHMANN
2003: 26).
Figure 7: The flooded quarter of Röderau-Süd
Source: Photo by Sachsenspiegel
(URL: http://www.mdr.de/sachsenspiegel/)
The fact that both the causes and consequences of floods go beyond domestic and
international borders makes coordination of state activities and those of the Länder
essential. This is also recognized with regard to non-structural measures and prepared-
ness. At present, ten centers are responsible for flood forecasting on the Elbe River: nine
Länder institutions and one federal office (Bundesanstalt für Gewässerkunde 2002: 45).
In addition, flood forecasts are made on a daily basis at the Flood Forecasting Center
Elbe in Magdeburg using the forecasting system ELBA and data from further eleven
gauge station at the Elbe, three at the Saale River, and one at the Havel River. Despite
the fact that numerous gauge stations (namely: Seidewitz, Müglitz, Rote Weißeritz, Wil-
de Weißeritz, Vereinigte Weißeritz, Vereinigte Mulde, Freiberger Mulde, Bobritzsch,
Striegis) at tributaries have been destroyed in 2002, flood forecasts were possible. This
was important since the forecasts served as a planning basis for the emergency
15
operation centers. Figure 8 shows the flood forecasting system of the Elbe River
drainage basin, including the gauge stations and their forecasting periods.
Figure 8: Flood forecasting in the Elbe River drainage basin
Source: modified after Bundesanstalt für Gewässerkunde (2002: 45)
2.2.2 Risk Financing
Risk financing measures, most notably insurance, are important instruments for
spreading risk. Insurance can be a powerful means for motivating the insured to take
loss reduction measures when premia or deductibles are tied to the level of mitigation
undertaken by the insured. On the other hand, it may be hard to assess the level of
mitigation undertaken and to structure contracts appropriately so there no disincentives
are provided resulting in the reduction of risk-minimizing efforts after having bought
insurance coverage (moral hazard).
As Table 8 illustrates, there are different types of institutional arrangements in flood
insurance. In Germany, insurance against natural hazards such as floods, earthquakes
and landslides is offered as a voluntary extension of property insurance and household
contents insurance. Only cover against storm and fire is included by default in the
insurance packages. In Eastern Germany, where before reunification household contents
insurance used to cover all natural hazards, a major share of these policies are
16
continued. To compare, in the UK, for example, flood insurance is automatically
“bundled” with residential property insurance, which is required as a condition for a
home mortgage. Moreover, flood insurance demand in Germany is rather low: about
10% of households in Western Germany are insured against floods, and ca. 30-40% in
Eastern Germany due to the continuation of all-hazard insurance contracts.
Table 8: Flood insurance scheme of selected countries
Germany United States United Kingdom
Role of state government No role Primary insurer No role
Type of flood insurance
available
Private insurance avail-
able as extension of
household policy
The National Flood In-
surance Program (NFIP)
insures household and
commercial property
Only private; automati-
cally included in home-
owner‘s policies
Reinsurance for
catastrophic losses
Private reinsurance If premium reserves ex-
hausted, NFIP borrows
at market rate from
treasury
Private reinsurance,
capacity considered suf-
ficient
Premium basis Premium on risk basis Partly on risk basis; high
risks are subsidized
through lower premium
Rates set according to
post code risks; risk-
based premiums avoid-
ing adverse selection
Government compensation
to insured and uninsured
Only in case of an
extreme event
Yes Only to uninsured who
are in great need
Government compensation
to local governments
Only in case of an
extreme event
Up to 75% of infrastruc-
ture repair is statutory
Yes, but minimal amount
Source: modified after LINNEROTH-BAYER et al. (2001: 63)
From 1960 to 1994, the federal state of Baden-Württemberg was the only Bundes-
land that had mandatory insurance covering flood damage (and since 1971 earthquake
damage) in addition to fire-, storm- and hail insurance. Since July 1994, the two state
insurance companies have been converted into two competing common stock compa-
nies since, in accordance with Art. 3/33 of the third EU coordination guideline, all
insurance monopolies – except for the social insurance monopoly – had to be abolished
by 1995. Also important is the fact that in 1991 the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Ver-
sicherungswesen (Federal Regulatory Authority for the Insurance Industry) permitted
more extensive insurance covering elemental risks for residential buildings, household
fixture, and business – without covering storm tide and backwater damage. While only
few additional cover for all-hazard insurance had been sold after the introduction in
17
1991, the earthquake of Roermond in April 1992 has increased dramatically the demand
for new insurance and stayed at a higher level ever since (see EIKENBERG 1998).
Furthermore, premia and deductibles are based on risk zones in Germany, whereas,
for example, in the National Flood Insurance Program in the USA premia in high risk
zones are partially subsidized by premia in lower risk areas, thus there are substantial
cross-subsidies from persons in low-risk to persons in high-risk areas – a kind of
solidarity through the private market (see Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2001). Finally, in
Germany, government compensation to the private sector and local governments is only
foreseen for very extreme events.
Recently, the German insurance industry established a rating system that defines the
exposure of all areas of the country to river floods according to three different exposure
classes: (I) areas that are affected less than once per fifty years and objects that are
insurable without restriction, (II) areas with floods in the recurrence interval range of
ten to fifty with basically insurable objects, and (III) areas on flood plains that are
affected by floods with recurrence interval range of up to ten years and with objects that
are not insurable or only under certain conditions (see KRON & THUMERER 2002: 13).
Moreover, Munich Re developed the world’s first flood loss accumulation model for an
entire country to carry out analyses of flood events occurring in Germany. In the
probable maximum loss (PLM) analysis the values of liabilities of a given portfolio
affected in one out of eight different accumulation scenarios are determined and the
probable losses estimated for fictitious ten-year to two-hundred-year floods (2002: 14f).
Spreading disaster risk over all Germany is not likely to be feasible without
mandatory insurance. After several attempts by some Länder to introduce a mandatory
insurance or an all-German insurance-pool there were discussions about adopting the
French model of semi-governmental insurance. However, nothing was ever realized. At
the end of 1995, the Arbeitskreis der Versicherungsaufsichtsbehörden der Länder
(Working Group for the Supervisory Authorities for the Insurance Industry) concluded
that such a model was unconstitutional because it interfered with the principle of self-
determination. Nevertheless, the Elbe floods have partly pushed new attempts and, for
instance, the Free State of Saxony strongly supports the introduction of a mandatory
disaster insurance on the European level (Sächsische Zeitung 2002: 1).
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3 Damages and Losses
3.1 State/Federal Level
In the third week of August, official German sources issued damage estimates for
Saxony of about € 15 billion (commerce: € 4-5 billion, private: € 3-4 billion,
infrastructure: € 5-7 billion), for Saxony-Anhalt of € 5-8 billion, and Bavaria of € 0.5-
1.5 billion. On August 28, 2002, overall damage was estimated to be € 20 billion
(PRÜFER 2002). According to Swiss Re (2002), the insured loss was estimated to be
substantially lower than the economic loss since flood insurance penetration is generally
low and/or sublimited in the affected countries. In Germany, significant flood events in
the past have led to insured shares of the economic loss of <10% in Bavaria (May 1999)
and approximately 20% in East Germany (Oder, 1997), in which one out of two
homeowners has flood insurance. Concerning the Elbe floods in 2002, Swiss Re’s
estimate of its loss exposure was approximately CHF 250 million.
With these estimated losses in mind, a special disaster relief and reconstruction fund
– the so-called Sonderfonds Aufbauhilfe – was set up. In December 2002, the € 20
billion was consequently revised to € 9.068 billion. The amount of financing of the
government fund was not significantly decreased. According to a press release from the
Federal Ministry of Justice (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2002), Table 9 shows both
the initial estimated (Die Welt 2002) and the original official estimate.
Table 9: ‘November-estimate’ and original official estimate of losses according to sector
Sector Estimated
Losses, 11/02
Official
Losses, 12/02
in billion € in billion € % total
Länder and municipal infrastructure 2.2 3.316 36.6%
Private households 2.6 2.547 28.1%
Private companies 2.1 1.438 15.9%
Federal infrastructure incl. relief costs 2.0 1.353 14.9%
Länder relief and protection costs - 0.223 2.5%
Agriculture 0.3 0.191 2.1%
Total 9.2 9.068 100.0%
Source: modified after Bundesministerium der Justiz (2002)
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Figure 9 graphically shows the distribution of losses. The major share accrued to
Länder- and municipally-owned infrastructure (36.6%). Private households suffered
about € 2.6 billion of losses (28.1%), followed by private companies (15.9%). Losses to
federal infrastructure including relief costs amounted to 14.9%, state relief and
protection costs amounted to 2.5% and agriculture to 2.1%.
Figure 9: Distribution of direct losses
Source: modified after Bundesministerium der Justiz (2002)
Concerning the regional distribution of losses, Saxony was hit hardest. With direct
damages of about € 6 billion the federal state bore 67% of the total losses. This value
makes up ca. 40% of the annual Saxon government budget (interview with U. Kraus,
December 10, 2002). About 14.9% of the overall damage was to federally owned
infrastructure in the affected areas; 11.3% to the state of Saxony-Anhalt. The losses
according to Länder are listed in Table 10.
About half of all losses from floods occur far away from major rivers and outside
major events that hit large areas and whole river systems (KRON & THUMERER 2002:
12). Also in August 2002, a lot of damage was caused in small areas by tributaries of
the Elbe River. In the case of Pirna, the city even suffered two floods: first from the
tributary Gottleuba River, and then from the mainstream Elbe.
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Table 10: Spatial distribution of flood losses
Federal State Loss Ratio Absolute (in €)
Saxony 67.0% 6.084 billion
Federal level 14.9% 1.353 billion
Saxony-Anhalt 11.3% 1.029 billion
Bavaria 2.2% 197.40 million
Lower Saxony 2.0% 174.29 million
Brandenburg 1.6% 144.65 million
Thuringia 0.5% 48.99 million
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 0.4% 32.91 million
Schleswig-Holstein 0.1% 4.22 million
Total 100.0% 9.068 billion
Source: Bundesministerium der Justiz (2002)
Focusing in on Saxony, losses were most severe in the region of Dresden, where ca.
47% of the losses occurred (see Table 11). Dresden and Pirna, the two municipalities
examined, constitute 13% and 2% respectively of total losses in Saxony.
Table 11: Losses in Saxony according to districts
District Absolute Losses
(in million €)
Loss
Ratio
Region Dresden 3.41 47%
of which Dresden 0.96 13%
of which Pirna 0.18 2%
Region Chemnitz 1.40 19%
Region Leipzig 1.28 18%
Source: Sächsische Staatsregierung (2002b)
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3.2 Municipal Level
Given the higher damage potential in Saxony’s capital, the highest losses occurred in
Dresden where the floods caused € 400 million losses of public assets (see Table 12).
Losses of private households were € 395 million (41% of total losses in Dresden) and
losses of businesses € 67 million (17% of total losses). Many cultural landmarks were
damaged, including the Semper Opera, the Zwinger Palace museum, and the train
station. At the time when the interviews were conducted in December, Dresden had
about 3,100 instances caused by the Elbe River or one of its tributaries. According to
government officials, roughly twenty-five percent of the companies had flood insurance
(interview with D. HILBERT, December 11, 2002).
Table 12: Losses in Dresden and Pirna according to sectors
Dresden Pirna
Sector Absolute Losses
(in million €)
% Total Replacement Costs
(in million €)
% Total
Public assets 400 42% 32.600 18.0%
Private Households 395 41% 111.100 61.4%
Business 167 17% 37.200 20.6%
Total 962 100% 180.900 100.0%
Source: Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (2003) and local government of Pirna, January 7, 2003
In Pirna, about fifteen percent of the total area had been damaged by the floods. The
loss analysis carried out by the local government records on January 7, 2003, an overall
damage of about € 181 million. The highest losses were suffered by residential
buildings with ca. € 111 million in damages, which is about 61.4% of the total damage.
Next are private firms with € 37 million losses (20.6%) of which private public
infrastructure suffered damages of about € 10.3 million.
22
4 Financing of the losses
Already during the floods a variety of response measures took place, ranging from
rescue and relief to humanitarian assistance from different governmental and nongov-
ernmental actors. The general public also exhibited an enormous solidarity not only in
collecting money but also in actively helping people affected by the floods (see Figure
10). Almost all interviewees pointed out the positive solidarity aspects during and after
the flood.
Figure 10: Public solidarity at the Albertbrücke in Dresden
Source: Photo by Otto STELLMACHER
The pictures of the flood stricken Saxony prompted many people across Germany to
donate generously for the affected residents. A few examples should illustrate the diver-
sity of donors: for instance, state governor MILBRADT established a donation account for
international transactions to support the victims of the flood disaster (see Figure 11).
The German Red Cross Organization (DRK) initiated a project “Neighbors in Need –
Flood 2002” and the German national soccer team decided to donate around € 500,000
to the flood victims. On August 16, a fund-raising gala in Burg sponsored by the public
TV channel ARD and the newspaper “Bild” collected € 16 million. According to ARD,
this was the largest donation total ever collected at a gala in German television history.
23
The media activity “Hamburg helps floods victims” of former chancellor Helmut
SCHMIDT compounded nine newspapers and TV channels and collected almost € 13
million (FINK 2003). In total, about € 242,6 million was donated by the general public
(interview with M. PRIESTERATH, December 10, 2002).
Figure 11: Saxony appeals for funds
Source: Sächsische Staatsregierung (2002c)
(URL: http://www.sachsen.de)
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The high public solidarity has certainly influenced the modus operandi of govern-
mental response measures, i.e. the reconstruction fund as an “externally-driven
measure”, and the set up of a special, independent commission as an “internally-driven
measure”. This so-called KIRCHBACH Commission (after General a.D. Hans-Peter
KIRCHBACH who is well-known for his role in commanding the German troops during
the River Odra floods in 1997) was set up to evaluate the response measures taken
during the Elbe River floods as well as to elaborate and evaluate proposals for modern
disaster protection structures. One important result of the assessment was a
demonstrated shortcoming of the warning systems. Also the public administration and
its communication structures were criticized. The KIRCHBACH-Report, 252 pages long
and published in December 2002, contains information concerning flood prevention
measures, disaster response, as well as proposals with regard to improving disaster
protection including flood protection and flood early warning systems. The report is
available in German at the web site of Saxony (http://www.sachsen.de).
4.1 Financing Sources
First, it should be mentioned that German federal states do not have the power to raise
revenue or to set their own tax rates. Pursuant to the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), the
Länder receive tax revenue under a system of apportionment, which entitles each
Bundesland to collect certain federal state taxes (Landessteuern) directly within its
territory. Examples of such taxes are: inheritance tax, property transfer tax, motor
vehicle tax, and beer tax. The Federal Government is likewise entitled to certain other
taxes on an exclusive basis (Bundessteuern) that are transferred to the Federal
Government after having been collected by the States. Examples here are: capital
transfer tax and insurance tax. At the same time, the Basic Law provides that the
revenue generated by personal income tax, corporate income tax and sales tax belongs
jointly to the Federal Government and the German Länder (Gemeinschaftsteuern).
The revenue generated from the Gemeinschaftsteuern is allocated among the Federal
Republic and the individual federal states and their respective municipalities. The Basic
Law provides that fifty percent of the revenue generated from the personal and corpo-
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rate income taxes belong to the Federal Government and the other half to the federal
states. Moreover, the Länder and the Federal Government are equally entitled to use the
revenue arising from the sales tax to cover their necessary expenditures. Consistent with
this principle, the sales tax revenue is first allocated vertically between the Federal
Government and the federal states as a whole based on their respective projected
expenditures. In 2001, 50.25% of the sales tax revenue generated during the year is
allocated to the Federal Government, and the remaining 49.75% to the Länder. At least
three-quarters of the Länder portion of the sales tax revenue is then distributed between
the federal states based upon the size of each state’s respective population. The
remaining quarter is allocated among the financially weaker Bundesländer. This
financial equalization for which tax revenue per capita is used as the metric – the so-
called Länderfinanzausgleich – is an important element of the German federal system.
Financial equalization is undertaken vertically and horizontally. Vertical equalization
denotes the transfer of resources from higher levels of government to lower levels,
horizontal equalization implies equalization among similar administrative levels (states,
municipalities).
The Elbe floods were considered a case for national solidarity rather than individual
responsibility or local solidarity. In the Elbe floods, the federal government, the states
(Länder) and the European Union were willing to massively fund an unprecedented
portion of damages. The declared will of the national government was that nobody
should be worse off than before the floods. National solidarity was invoked and a
special national disaster relief and reconstruction fund – the so-called Sonderfonds
Aufbauhilfe – amounting to € 7.1 billion was created.
The Aufbauhilfe-fund was created by means of tax raises in all of Germany regulated
by the Fluthilfesolidaritätsgesetz, a special flood help solidarity law decreeing:
• One year shift of planned decrease of income tax rate until 1.1.2004;
• Increase of corporate income tax of 1.5% percentage point to 26.5% for one year;
• Fund will be € 7.1 billion even if additional tax revenue falls short of this amount.
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This large amount of government financing is unheard of for any other natural
disaster in Germany since World War II; there were, however, several exceptional
circumstances that need to be considered:
• Extreme event, largest losses ever in Germany: many hydrological records were
broken and the floods are commonly referred to as the millennium floods
(Jahrtausendhochwasser).
• The floods mainly affected East Germany that is still struggling economically and
where unemployment is high. The general reconstruction of East Germany
(Aufbau Ost) is considered an important long-term issue of national solidarity.
• Some observers cite the “hot” election phase. Federal elections were in their final
stages of what was known to be a very close election.
Additionally, financing came from the following sources (see Figure 12):
• EU solidarity fund: an EU solidarity fund for emergencies was newly created with
an annual amount of € 1 billion. Parts will be available already in 2002. In total, it
€ 444 millions were transferred to reconstruction financing in the affected German
areas (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2002). This fund will be used in the future to
also fund other complex emergencies, like e.g. oil spills.
• Private donations amounted to € 243 million (Interview with M. PRIESTERATH,
December 10, 2002).
• Insurance indemnity payments are estimated to sum up to € 1.8 billion (Munich
Re 2003), which is approximate 20% of total losses. In Germany, penetration of
flood insurance bought by private households as an extension to their households
contents or property insurance is low (ca. 10%), however, in East Germany,
former insurance policies, that did include disaster coverage, were continued after
the reunification, thus penetration is higher at about 30-40%. About 25% of
affected businesses had purchased insurance.
Estimating the availability of all these sources, in total € 9.6 billion can be expected
to be available thus exceeding the losses of € 9.1 billion. Considering that government
compensation will be provided in terms of replacement costs rather than current value
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lost, still all direct losses could be compensated, in theory. However, as explained later,
it was generally not planned to compensate losses 100%, so some of the money set aside
by the government for compensation will probably flow back to the budget.
Figure 12: Losses and financing sources
Source: Staatskanzlei Freistaat Sachsen (2002), Munich Re (2003), Interview PRIESTERATH
Compared to total compensation provided in other major events in developed
countries, which on average amounted to 45% of total losses (Linneroth-Bayer at al.
2001),1 this large financing provided is exceptional. Figure 13 shows the amounts
compensated by insurance and state aid and the uncompensated amounts for these
events in terms of total average reported direct losses across 7 earthquakes and flood
events in the 1990’s. As illustrated, the financial aid provided in 2002 was also excep-
tional for German standards. For instance, in the 1993 River Rhine floods considered an
event with a return period in the range of 100 years and causing direct damages in
excess of € 550 million, state aid amounted to 10% and about 60% of the losses
remained uncompensated (Linneroth-Bayer et al. (2001: 19). Possible explanations are
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the upcoming elections for the German Bundestag, the extreme magnitude of the flood
event, and the geographical location.
Figure 13: Loss compensation in 7 severe natural disasters
Source: LINNEROOTH-BAYER et al. (2001: 48)
The sectoral distribution of financing was broadly similar to the losses incurred in the
respective sectors. In general the fraction of losses financed was higher for reconstruc-
tion than for private households and businesses in order not to provide adverse incen-
tives for the private sector. This does not mean that all direct losses will be covered by
this financing ratio. For instance, the financing ratios specified in the Sonderfonds
Aufbauhilfe differ for the affected sectors as will be explained further below.
The regional distribution of financing corresponds to the distribution of losses. In
Table 13, also financing going to the reconstruction of federal assets is included which
1 These events were the Rhine floods in 1993 and 1995 in Germany, the Midwest floods in the USA 1993,
the Northridge earthquake in 1994 in the USA, the Kobe earthquake in 1995, the Umbria earthquake in
1997, the 1997 floods in Poland and the Easter floods in 1998 in the UK.
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explains that the financing ratios are higher than the loss ratios in Table 10. The major
share of financing is and will be distributed to Saxony.
Table 13: Distribution of reconstruction fund (Sonderfonds Aufbauhilfe)
Federal State Loss Ratio
Saxony 78.85%
Saxony-Anhalt 13.34%
Bavaria 2.56%
Lower Saxony 2.26%
Brandenburg 1.87%
Thuringia 0.64%
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 0.43%
Schleswig-Holstein 0.05%
Source: Bundesministerium der Justiz (2002)
4.2 Principles Used in Loss Financing
Providing relief and loss compensation is an obligation of government; however, it also
raises important questions about equity, efficiency and the provision and maintenance of
incentives for ex-ante mitigation and risk-financing measures. In the Elbe floods case,
several principles were put forward and used by the government authorities for the
financing of the losses (Staatskanzlei Freistaat Sachsen 2002) in order to guarantee the
efficient allocation of the funds, allow quick reconstruction and provide and keep
incentives for ex-ante measures.
Subsidiarity: The principle of subsidiarity (Subsidaritätsprinzip) is constitutive for
the federalist structure of Germany and denotes the delegation of responsibilities to the
lowest administrative level feasible. The principle of subsidiarity was followed in the
financing of losses. A core element of the publicly financed assistance was the
reconstruction of infrastructure owned by municipalities, which constitutes the major
part of public infrastructure. The Subsidaritätsprinzip was used insofar as decisions
about reconstruction were delegated to the municipalities:
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• Municipalities had to elaborate plans for reconstruction and determine priorities.
• Compensation fraction was high: minimum 90%, sometimes even up to 100%
were planned to be reimbursed (the process is still ongoing).
• Municipalities could exceed maximum of allocated limits in order to quickly and
sufficiently rebuild.
Furthermore, immediately after the event, the local authorities were given money to
provide private households with emergency relief funds.
Parallelity: Reconstruction in Saxony was and is to run parallel and independent of
Aufbau Ost (reconstruction in East Germany); no financing from Aufbau Ost was to be
diverted for flood losses in order not to hamper the general reconstruction. This division
of funding is also used for matters of bookkeeping, where budgets are kept separate.
Incentives: It was generally emphasized that the government is not the “insurer of last
resort.” The Elbe floods were considered an exceptional event this time, but in general
the population should take appropriate prevention and risk financing measures. In order
to provide incentives, deductibles were included when distributing state or federal help
(i.e. full compensation was usually not granted). Also, in case of an existing insurance
protection, attention was paid to avoiding overcompensation when providing financial
assistance. Thus, incentives for mitigation and insurance were maintained.
Efficiency: Losses were defined rather narrowly in order to compensate efficiently and
ensure that assistance was sufficient for financing the direct losses in the localities that
were affected strongest. The following issues were brought forward:
• Financing should be done for direct losses only, as financing indirect losses also
may exceed financial ability and it was felt that these losses could not be be
estimated with precision. It was feared, that else other states that were not affected
as strongly or more indirectly by increased precipitation would use those funds.
• Financing of losses only that arose from 10th August to 30th August during
flooding of Elbe and its direct and indirect feeder rivers.
• Smaller losses due to heavy precipitation were not to be financed by money from
federal/state program.
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Focus on ability to rebuild: Loss financing was provided in terms of reconstruction
costs rather than current value. In effect this means higher loss compensation than if
current values had been used, and allows to rebuild according to the current state of
technology thus improving conditions.
A general problem with financing was that the total amount of the Sonderfonds
Aufbauhilfe was determined before losses were fully clear. After downward revision of
losses, some states were intent on broadening the definition of losses to be reimbursed
in order to deplete the fund for their purposes. They argued in favor of including
indirect damages like business interruption losses in order to increase the fraction of
losses compensated.
The financing measures fall into two phases (see Table 14):
• First phase: emergency relief. Unbureaucratic, quick help was provided.
• Second phase: reconstruction assistance, “differentiated loss compensation”. More
rules were employed and a more careful evaluation was undertaken in order to
allocate money to greatest needs. Generally, a deductible was included to
guarantee the efficient allocation of money.
Table 14: Financing programs
Emergency Relief
Financing
Private
Households
Residential
Property
Business Agriculture &
Forestry
500 €/person,
max. 2000
€/household
5,000 €/building 15,000 € (50% of
loss) and 500
€/employee
50,000 €
Reconstruction
Financing Assistance
Municipal
Infrastructure
Residential
Property
Business Agriculture &
Forestry
90% of
reconstruction
costs
Max. 80% of
reconstruction
costs
35-75% of
reconstruction
costs
Max. 30% of crop
losses,
max. € 1 million
Source: Staatskanzlei Freistaat Sachsen (2002)
What concerns the reconstruction program, for which the major part of the
Sonderfonds Aufbauhilfe money will be disbursed, generally full compensation was not
planned. The highest compensation ratio was foreseen for the infrastructure sector with
funding for 90% of the losses, for private households a maximum of 80% of losses to be
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financed were foreseen, for private business this ratio was set at 75% as a maximum.
Also, insurance disbursements were regulated to be counted in order to prevent
overcompensation. The intention in using deductibles was to provide incentive for the
future to engage in loss prevention and financing measures and guarantee the efficient
use of the provided funds, which was felt would occur if a portion had to be provided by
the affected themselves.
Major aims in devising these measures were to repair buildings and institutions as
quickly as possible and prepare at least for the winter and help the economy to recoup as
quickly as possible. In total, it is planned to finish the major part of reconstruction by
the end of 2004, i.e. 18 month after the floods.
These measures had to balance conflicting objectives between necessary fast assis-
tance and the level of care derived from state and municipal laws and regulation to
ensure the efficient and transparent assistance meeting the needs of those affected.
What is interesting to note is that by December, only ca. 2,000 claims from private
households had been filed in all affected areas in Germany, whereas the total number of
affected was estimated at 10,000 households. Thus, sufficient funds were still available
in the Sonderfonds Aufbauhilfe for compensating private households.
4.3 Loss Financing on Municipal Level
As shown in Table 15, both Dresden and Pirna suffered high losses in absolute terms
and when compared to annual budgets.
Table 15: Losses in Dresden and Pirna in comparison
Dresden Pirna
in million € % of budget 2002 in million € % of budget 2002
Total losses 962.0 114% 181.0 292%
Losses to municipality 400.0 47% 22.0 35%
Budget 2002 847.0 - 62.0 -
Expected own municipal
contribution (10% of losses) 40.0 5% 2.2 4%
Sources: Local governments of Dresden and Pirna, MDR (2003)
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In Dresden, total losses in all sectors as a ratio of the budget amounted to 114%, in
Pirna even 292%. Losses to municipal infrastructure amounted to 47% respectively 35%
of the budgets in Dresden and Pirna. City officials in both cities asserted that it would
have been impossible to finance these losses, let alone compensate private households
or firms (see Figure 12).
Figure 14: Losses in Dresden and Pirna compared to municipal budgets
Sources: Interviews with U. KRAUS and I. HUMAN
The municipalities expect to receive 90% of their losses in the currently ongoing
negotiations from the Sonderfonds Aufbauhilfe. Thus, Dresden and Pirna will only have
to finance ca. 5% respectively 4% of their losses themselves. Additionally, these frac-
tions will probably decrease, as donations and in the case of Pirna insurance indemnity
payments will come forward (these amounts were as of the time of writing not
disclosed).
Due to declining income from corporation tax revenue in the last few years, both
cities are heavily constrained in their financial means. City officials stated that they
would not have been able to finance these losses. Therefore, aid from the Sonderfonds
Aufbauhilfe was welcome.
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In Dresden, as demanded by Saxon state law, it was planned for the hundred-year
flood event. Analyses and regulations existed for such events, but consequently, for
rarer events no maps existed and an event of this magnitude was generally not expected.
The city lost € 400 million mostly in municipal infrastructure. Although the delibera-
tions about loss financing are not finished, Dresden expects to receive 90% of its losses
to be paid out from 2002-2006 with 50% to be disbursed in 2002/2003. Dresden was not
insured. Accordingly, € 40 million have to be provided by mainly by budget diversion
(possibly also to small degree by private donations), which according to city officials
will be painful. However, the floods and the impacts on the budget were not mentioned
in the budget proposal for 2003 indicating that extra costs can be financed. Generally,
city officials asserted that financing € 400 million by own means would have never been
possible for Dresden and considered solidarity financing the right approach for the Elbe
floods and similar future events of this magnitude.
The municipality did not finance losses of private households and business, but
disbursed relief money to private households and business that it received from the
Sonderfonds Aufbauhilfe. It is estimated that ca. 25% of private businesses in Dresden
were insured. 3,100 cases were noted in this sector with 22,000 employees affected.
For the future, a number of measures relating to flood protection and prevention are
planned. These will have to be financed in addition to the city’s loss element. This will
be difficult as there generally is competition for other projects. This was described by a
city official during an interview with the statement “The issue is whether to finance the
opera house or undertake flood measures?”
Prevention measures planned for the future include
• Maps will be produced for rarer than 100-year events;
• Risk classes will be determined, which will be used to inform potential dwellers;
• Improvement of flood prediction;
• Improvement of contact to upstream Czech authorities;
• Improvement of coordination with state authorities.
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In total, the municipality of Dresden sees its role as providing citizens with the
information necessary to act most sensibly before and during floods. It was argued
against using regulation e.g. for compulsory insurance by private households. Private
citizens are considered hardly able to finance protection or ex-ante financing measures
themselves due to low accumulated savings, which is typical of the East German
economy and the private sector. Furthermore, it was mentioned by the city officials that
one problem with risk zoning is that such a measure could have negative effects on the
economy. For those planning to build in higher-risk areas marked accordingly as high-
risk zones, the ability to take out loans or insurance will be severely affected. This could
negatively influence larger companies decision, which in Dresden are mostly sub-
sidiaries of Western German companies, to come to Dresden or to stay on.
With regard to Pirna, the city’s losses to municipal assets and infrastructure
amounted to € 22 million, of which Pirna expects, like Dresden, to have to contribute
ca. 10%, € 2.2 million. In contrast to Dresden municipal assets in Pirna were insured to
a certain degree. This was felt necessary due to the high risk exposure of Pirna. In 1997,
Pirna had purchased a so-called Elementarschadenversicherung (all-hazard insurance)
covering damage caused by different natural hazards, such as, earthquakes, landslides,
avalanches, and floods. According to the city government, the insurance premiums have
amounted to € 214,000 since 1997 and € 39,500 in 2002 (interview with I. HUMAN,
December 11, 2002).
With regard to the Elbe River floods, the majority of the municipal buildings losses
(without fixture) were insured, and also the loss of rent and recovery costs were
compensated; deductible was one percent of the insurance sum. Since the insurance
cover ended on December 31, 2002, the city government arranged a European-wide
public call for insurance cover. Although it is not clear whether a new carrier can be
found, it is, however, certain that the new cover would be more expensive.
The amount of insurance indemnity that will be provided is still unclear. This amount
will be calculated in into the sum to be received from the Sonderfonds Aufbauhilfe, thus
overcompensation will not occur. In addition to insurance, own contributions will be
financed by budget diversion and donations. Additionally, the insurance provider
cancelled the contract after the floods. Pirna is intent on getting coverage again.
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Similarly as in Dresden, an extreme event like the Elbe floods was never foreseen.
As demanded by state law, it was planned for the hundred-year flood, for which
analyses existed. As in Dresden, Pirna officials asserted that they would not have been
able to finance private sector losses. About 20% of private households are estimated to
have carried insurance, how much will be reimbursed by insurance is as of today still
unclear. Additionally, city officials found it necessary that full compensation of private
households and businesses is not done, but rather that deductibles for incentives are
kept. Solidarity financing as done for the floods was considered very important and
officials were grateful for the support granted.
Concerning risk and disaster management, Pirna sees this obligation to lie with the
district administration (Kreisverwaltung) as Pirna, unlike Dresden, is not an independ-
ent city, and is part of a district, which is the responsible administrative body for
disaster management. Pirna officials see the need to closer cooperate with this
administration.
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5 Conclusion
In August 2002, floods in central Europe caused damage in the range of € 15 billion;
insured losses were about € 3billion. According to Munich Re, this event was the most
expensive disaster of the year 2002 in terms of economic losses. The greatest losses
occurred in Germany where heavy rains led to some of the worst flooding the Free State
of Saxony has witnessed in more than a century. On August 13, the Elbe River rose
from a normal summer level of about two meters to reach on August 17, 2002, a water
level of 9.40 m – the highest level that has ever been recorded in Dresden. From a
hydrological perspective, thus, the Elbe River floods are an extreme event.
The Elbe River floods caused about € 9 billion of direct losses in Germany.
Concerning the regional distribution of losses, Saxony was hit hardest with a damage of
€ 6.084 billion. About 14.9% (€ 1.353 billion) of the overall damage was to federally
owned infrastructure and 11.3% (€ 1.029 billion) to the state of Saxony-Anhalt.
The major share of about € 4.790 billion accrued to federal state and municipal
infrastructure (64.7%). Private households suffered about € 2.547 billion of losses
(28.1%), followed by private companies with € 1.438 billion (15.9%), relief provided by
the state governments amounted to € 223 (2.5%), and agriculture with € 191million
(2.1%).
The event was considered a case for national and international solidarity: Estimating
the availability of all the financing sources, in total € 9.6 billion can be expected to be
available thus exceeding the losses of € 9.1 billion. Considering that government
compensation will be provided in terms of reconstruction costs rather than current value
lost, still all direct losses could be compensated in theory. However, it was generally not
planned to compensate losses 100%, so some of the money set aside by the government
for compensation will probably flow back to the budget.
The major part of the financing was provided by a special disaster relief and
reconstruction fund – the Sonderfonds Aufbauhilfe – created by the federal and state
governments of Germany. The fund amounted to € 7.1 billion, 78% of total direct
losses. Other sources of financing were a newly created EU fund (€ 444 million),
insurance (estimated to amount to € 1.800 billion) and private donations (€ 244 million).
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The size of the Sonderfonds Aufbauhilfe was determined after early rough estimates
and the total amount of financing made available was not adapted after losses were
revised downward by ca. 50%. This had the effect that some states were intent on
receiving additional money from the fund, e.g. for precipitation events rather than flood
damages. Since public money was available, the state of Saxony-Anhalt, for instance,
argued for expanding the definition of flood damage, i.e. also indirect losses and losses
caused by precipitation and rising groundwater should be compensated. Finally, this
argumentation was not followed, and only direct losses were considered for compen-
sation.
The provision of government funds to the affected private households, companies
and municipalities was and is governed by a set of principles in order to guarantee the
efficient and fair allocation of the funds, allow quick reconstruction and provide
incentives for ex-ante measures. These principles included subsidiarity (the delegation
of responsibilities to the lowest administrative level feasible), parallelity (reconstruction
in the affected East German region was and is to run parallel and independent of the
reconstruction in East Germany after reunification), provision of incentives (inclusion of
deductibles in order to maintain incentives for mitigation and insurance), efficiency
(financing of direct losses only to primarily compensate those affected worst), and the
focus on the ability to rebuild (loss financing was provided in terms of reconstruction
costs rather than current values).
There were two phases for the funding from the Sonderfonds Aufbauhilfe:
• First phase where emergency relief was unbureaucratically and quickly distributed
to affected people.
• In the still ongoing second phase, reconstruction assistance was and is provided.
Here, more rules and a more careful evaluation of claims was/is undertaken in
order to allocate money efficiently to greatest needs. Generally, deductibles were
included for this financing in order to guarantee the efficient allocation of money.
Financing on the municipal level for two cities in Saxony was examined: Dresden,
the capital of Saxony, and Pirna, a smaller city. These two cities experienced large
damages to their infrastructure and public assets. Dresden € 400 million, equaling 47%
of the budget of 2002, Pirna € 22 million or 35% of the budget. The two cities expect to
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be reimbursed 90% of their damages in the currently ongoing financing provided by the
national fund. The remaining amounts, they will pay by private donations and budget
diversion. In addition, Pirna had purchased insurance and expects indemnity payments
from this source.
Also, large losses suffered by private households and businesses in Dresden and
Pirna, these losses will not be financed by the two municipalities. Again, financing for
these losses is to a large degree coming from the government fund. Households can
expect to receive 80% of their losses, businesses up to 75% from this fund.
Municipalities feel that losses caused by extreme events like the Elbe River floods
need to be financed through national and international solidarity (i.e. taxes), though
Pirna, a smaller city facing a high flood risk has undertaken some insurance of its assets.
The municipalities see their roles as assessing the risk and providing warnings in time,
not as compensating flood victims. This is a common view today, as corporation tax
revenue in municipalities is decreasing.
When assessing a disaster event such as the Elbe River floods, it is necessary to take
into consideration the context in which the event is embedded. For instance, the
frequency of the hazard is of importance with regard to the flooding in 2002. State and
local authorities in Saxony and Elbe regions by regulation have to plan for hundred-year
floods – which was done. However, setting up flood protection for higher water levels is
economically not feasible. Given the low probability of disaster occurrence in any local
community over the short run, measures aimed at increasing prevention and prepared-
ness are hardly cost effective in Germany.
Since disaster mitigation measures in Germany cannot fully prevent losses from very
extreme events, the public expects the federal government to be politically and finan-
cially accountable for disaster management, in particular response and recovery. The
federal government for its part responds to these pressures by reemphasizing responsi-
bility for disaster management on local and Länder level as well as by legislatively
increasing the variety and scope of individual assistance. The current emphasis on indi-
vidual responsibility reflects the federal government’s reduction of financial and legal
responsibilities in disaster protection. Hence, there are political cross-pressures of
simultaneously pursuing disaster management and political responsiveness: appropriate
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policy response should focus on long-term support for prevention and preparedness –
actual policy response focuses on response and recovery.
Another important issue concerning the loss compensation was the national elections.
Though the federal states are responsible for disaster protection, politicians of the
national government were extremely sensitive to the proximity of elections and their
chances for reelection. Since in Germany a new government was to be elected about a
month after the Elbe River floods, many politicians reacted to media reports about the
large scope of the disaster. Analysts generally agree that the floods boosted the govern-
ment’s standing in the polls in the run-up to the general elections that took place shortly
after the flood event.
The high solidarity of the public was a central characteristic of the Elbe River floods,
both concerning financial donations and active support. In East Germany, as in West
Germany, people have settled in traditional flood plains over the past decades to
accommodate private and commercial buildings. This has led to an increased accumula-
tion of economic values in flood prone areas – and may lead to a decrease in solidarity
in the future. In the case of Röderau-Süd, a small community located in a flood plain
area will be relocated – a flood prevention measure which is quite rare in Germany.
Already in 1996, a study “Deficits in disaster mitigation in industrialized countries –
using Germany as an example” of the German IDNDR-Committee (see DOMBROWSKY
& BRAUNER 1996) has indicated severe shortcomings in German disaster precaution.
Among others, the lack of financing the siren warning system, or a lack of coordination,
education and self-help measures was mentioned. Likewise, the KIRCHBACH-Report, the
result of an investigation conducted by an independent commission, identified short-
comings in communication structures and flood protection. The commissioning of such
studies and the formation of commissions are positive signals since disasters, by their
very nature, require the participation of multiple actors, whose legitimacy is derived
from alternative authority sources. Hence, coordination will become more important for
mitigation, risk transfer and response activities, but also more problematic due to the
increased potential for more severe disasters and an increasing number of participating
actors.
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